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THE NEGOTIATION OF THE 1999 PACIFIC SALMON
AGREEMENT
Donald McRae"
I want to build on the background provided by David Colson and de-
scribe the process by which the Pacific Salmon dispute was resolved and the
1999 Agreement concluded. The process was complicated, involving pro-
vincial, state, tribal, industry and environmental interests.
The Issues
The legal dispute surrounding the Pacific Salmon/Treaty (PST) related to
Article I. Article III provides that the Parties are to conduct their fisheries
so as to: "prevent over fishing and provide for optimum production," (known
as the conservation principle) and "provide for each Party to receive benefits
equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its waters" (known as
the equity principle).
Article III also provides that in fulfilling their obligations, the Parties are
to take into account the desirability in most cases of reducing interceptions
and the desirability in most cases of avoiding undue disruptions of existing
fisheries.
Canada claimed that the principle of receiving benefits form the produc-
tion of its rivers was a legal entitlement. This meant, Canada argued, that
interceptions could be measured and counted according to stocks, numbers
and values, and that these had to be balanced between the two countries. So
that if one side intercepted more of the other side's fish, then it had to pay
back by reducing interceptions either in the same fishery or elsewhere.
The U.S., by contrast, did not accept that there was any agreed or auto-
matic way of measuring interception imbalances. Reducing interceptions,
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the U.S. argued was "desirable" under the treaty, not a matter of obligation.
Moreover, the U.S. wanted to focus on the provision in Article III that re-
ferred to the desirability of avoiding disruptions of existing fisheries. How-
ever, the U.S. was never prepared to have the matter of legal interpretation
tested by international arbitration.
What did all this mean in practice? In 1985, the interception imbalances
were potentially manageable. But, since then, U.S. interceptions increased
and Canadian interceptions declined. By the time the allocation annexes
expired in 1992, the balance was decidedly in favor of the U.S. This re-
sulted, in part from the fact that stocks were abundant in Alaska and catches
were correspondingly high. By contrast, as a result of declines in Washing-
ton and Oregon stocks, Canadian interceptions of southern U.S. fish were
dropping. At the same time, Fraser River sockeye interceptions by U.S. fish-
ers were also high.
To remedy this interception imbalance would have involved substantial
cutbacks by Alaska. And in a mixed stock fishery in which Canadian fish are
only a small proportion of total SE Alaska catch; this would require the
Alaskans to stop fishing their own stocks in order to reduce interception of
Canadian stocks. It would also require the U.S. in the south to reduce their
interceptions of Canadian Fraser River stocks. From Alaska's point of view,
stock declines in Washington and Oregon, and hence declines in Canadian
interception of U.S. fish, were attributable to the failure of Washington and
Oregon to preserve their river and stream habitats. Thus, Alaskans saw
themselves as having to pay the price, by reducing their catch, for misman-
agement by the southern states. This they were not prepared to do.
As a result, the negotiations for new allocations, with Canada insisting on
a strict application of the equity principle and the U.S. resisting this, had
been protracted, filled with recriminations, and unsuccessful. The PSC could
not resolve the issue. Special negotiations were appointed by each side- on
the U.S. side successive special negotiations- mediation was attempted but
abandoned, direct negotiations amongst the industry stakeholders was at-
tempted, and in 1997 frustration in Prince Rupert amongst fishers at failure to
get an interim agreement with the U.S. led to the blockading of an Alaskan
state ferry in Prince Rupert Harbor. By now, the Pacific Salmon issue had
become the most difficult issue in Canada- U.S. relations.
Two special envoys, David Strangway and William Ruckelshaus were
asked by Prime Minister Chretien and President Clinton to look at the matter.
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They reviewed the stakeholder negotiation process and concluded that it
could not work and they said that the governments had to resolve the issues
themselves. They went on to say that Canada had to reduce its demand and
that the U.S. had to move more fish to Canada. New negotiations were ap-
pointed in March of 1998. Attempts to negotiate a one-year solution for
1998 were only partially successful, and as 1998 drew to a close it looked as
if negotiations for a long-term solution were doomed like all of the previous
efforts.
What happened next? Well, to understand the process, I think that we
have to look at who was involved- the players- and the interests that were at
stake. Then I will talk about how we went about the negotiations.
The Players
In Canada, the federal government has responsibility for the management
of fisheries. But, of course, the Province of British Columbia had a direct
economic interest in the dispute. But relations between the province and the
federal government on this issue were fractious, to say the least. The others
who were directly involved in the process were the representatives of the
commercial fishery, the aboriginal fishery and the sports fishery. These
groups were all represented in the Pacific Salmon Commission and had taken
part in the stakeholder negotiations. In fact, negotiating sessions would in-
volve a delegation of thirty to fifty people. This made compromise almost
impossible. Moreover, what was missing was a public environmental per-
spective on the fishery.
On the U.S. side, although the federal government was nominally respon-
sible, voting in the PSC was in the hands of the states (Washington, Oregon
and Alaska) and the Tribes. The U.S. government was only one amongst
five. Negotiations were conducted with all of these groups at the table, who
with their advisers constituted another thirty to fifty people. The U.S. federal
government was able to do nothing unless the states and the Tribes agreed
and past inexperience showed that the U.S. federal government had difficulty
forging an agreement amongst its domestic interests. And, from what I have
already said, part of the problem was between Alaska and the southern states
over who was responsible for conservation in the south.
And, the situation in the U.S. was even more complicated than this. Ne-
gotiating at the table on the complex issues of allocation was one thing. Hav-
ing the political climate in the U.S. in favor of making the necessary com-
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promises was another. This required governors of the states to be on side, as
well as the tribal leadership, Congress and the White House. And while the
White House and the governors of those states were all Democrats, the key
Congressional figures were Republicans- all from Alaska. So there had to be
parallel contacts and initiatives at these political levels.
Moreover, political support can be very fickle. It was clear that White
House interest, which came from Vice President Gore's off ice could not last
much beyond the middle of 1999. After that, the attention of Vice President
Gore's staff was going to be on other things. Thus, looking at things at the
end of 1998, suggested that there was going to be a relatively narrow window
of opportunity in 1999 to get an agreement.
The Interests
One of the complexities of this dispute is that the issued do not divide
neatly along national lines. It was a dispute between Canada and the U.S.
But, in reality, the nature of the interests depended on the nature of the fish-
ery. And that varied north and south. Geography and the patterns of fish
migration dictate that the Alaska-Canada relationship in the north is in part
the reverse of the Canada- Washington/Oregon relationship in the south.
Remember that in the north, the Alaskans intercept fish bound for Canadian
rivers, and in the south Canadian fishers intercept fish bound for the rivers of
Washington and Oregon. The interests also varied between different fisher-
ies. Those who fished for Chinook on both sides of the border had different
interests from the seiners who fished sockeye or coho, on both sides of the
border. And the seiners differed from the gillnetters.
This was recognized in the original treaty that sought to administer each
fishery differently. Historically, each side had sought to reconcile the inter-
ests on their own side before dealing with the other. This, too, compounded
the difficulty of reaching and agreement.
All of these issues had existed in the past. What changed?
The Change in the Environment
By the end of 1998 certain changes had emerged that were to make nego-
tiations in 1999 different from previous years. There were two critical fac-
tors, one in Canada and one in the U.S. In Canada, by 1998 two of our do-
mestic coho stocks were at crisis level- Upper Skeena Coho and Upper
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Thompson Coho. The Minister of Fisheries had concluded that the only way
to save these stocks was to take the extreme measure of declaring zero mor-
tality for endangered coho. Unless a fishery could guarantee zero mortality,
it was closed. And since this affected most areas on the west coast, the im-
pact on the commercial fishery was drastic.
In the context of the PST, this meant that we were intercepting even less
U.S. fish. It made attempting to resolve the interception problem by having
parallel reduction s in the U.S. fishery completely unrealistic. Would Alaska
really close down its fishery in order to balance interceptions because we had
decided to close our fishery for conservations reasons? Particularly with the
fact that ours stocks comprised little more than one percent of Alaska's catch.
But our domestic conservation problem also highlighted something else.
What was the point in having Alaska return fish to Canada if we could not
harvest them because we had closed our own fishery? To argue that they
should is a rather perverse form of "we don't want them, but you can't have
them." Having the U.S. take measures that would help us with our conversa-
tion was much more important in some areas than having them return har-
vestable fish that we could not harvest. In terms of obtaining benefits from
the production from our rivers, under Article 1II, conserved fish were going
to be the real benefit for Canada.
The critical factor in the U.S. was also related to conservation. The
NMFS was in the process of designated certain Washington and Oregon Chi-
nook stocks as endangered under the ESA. Such a designation has implica-
tions for harvest and for habitat and could have enormous impacts on the
economy of the region. It can affect industrial development in areas where
salmon-spawning streams are found. In Washington those areas of develop-
ment meant Boeing and Microsoft. Harvest reductions that ensure that ESA
requirements are met can reduce the need for habitat expenditures and
restrictions. In short, a new political dynamic was developing in some parts
of the U.S. for a resolution of the Pacific salmon issue.
The Process
There were two fundamental problems with the negotiating process.
First, on the Canadian side, there was the lack of cooperation from the gov-
ernment of the Province of British Columbia. You cannot negotiate if the
Premier of British Columbia in the middle of a negotiating session with the
U.S withdraws part of your team. You cannot negotiate if members of your
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fifty person advisory group feel free to talk to the press about any details of
the negotiation with which they disagree.
The second problem was the historic inability of the U.S. to coordinate a
negotiation position, to reconcile the interests, north and south, that it had
within its position. The U.S. federal government could not control the states
or the Tribes. Their rights under the PST had been enshrined in legislation.
And, as I have suggested, the competing interests within the U.S. were in-
tense and their battles often acrimonious.
In response, on the Canadian side we did two things. First, we reduced
the Canadian negotiating team down to three individuals with technical ad-
visers, fisheries scientists and managers, who worked very closely with the
relevant federal ministers. This meant that many people who traditionally
had been involved in the process were excluded both within government and
outside, and this caused some resentment both during the process and when
the agreement was concluded.
Second, in dealing with the U.S., we were not able to reduce their negoti-
ating team to the same degree but changes did occur. We began to meet with
the Alaskans separately from the south, and the south separately from the
Alaskans. We gave up on formal, stylized meetings between the two gov-
ernments where each side presented fOormal positions- something that had
characterized previous negotiations. Instead, we talked informally, some-
times over dinner. In this way we avoided the problem that had existed in
the past of the U.S. being unable to put together a position because it could
not get internal agreement first. By meeting with the Alaskans and the
southern states and Tribes separately we were able to help them forge an
agreement that internally they were unable to coordinate. In a peculiar way,
the Canadian team played a mediating role within the U.S. negotiating team.
From January to June of 1999 we engaged in negotiations. Officially
they were technical discussions, but in the course of those discussions the
framework for the final deal emerged. The pattern was to have an initial
discussion of the general framework, then have the technical fisheries ex-
perts, small groups of fisheries scientists and fisheries managers from both
sides, produce a draft and then use that as a basis for discussion.
In some cases that draft became the final version with the relevant alloca-
tion numbers negotiated and added in; in other cases the draft was rewritten
and renegotiated. What was obvious was that in spite of notorious and diffi-
6
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 27 [2001], Iss. , Art. 45
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol27/iss/45
McRae-THE PACIFIC SALMON DISPUTE
cult public battles over Pacific salmon, there was the potential for a high de-
gree of cooperation at the technical level on both sides of the border.
At the same time contact was been maintained at the variety of different
levels political levels, I referred to earlier. Contact had been maintained with
the governors of Washington and Alaska, with key congressmen, with the
White House. At one point the White House appointed Washington lawyer,
Lloyd Cutler, as its representative to the negotiations. In this regard, critical
roles were played by Fisheries Minister David Anderson, the Canadian Em-
bassy in Washington DC, and Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy. Indeed, it
was this parallel political track, which the British Columbia government had
misunderstood in 1998, accusing Minister David Anderson of trying to "hi-
jack" the negotiations.
The negotiations were kept private and it was not until about a week be-
fore we were ready to announce that an agreement had been reached that the
press became aware than an agreement was even a possibility. That agree-
ment was announced on June 3, and it was concluded formally on June 30.
The Outcome
The agreement is technically complex. As I mentioned, often it was
drafted by scientists- in fact my counterpart, the U.S. Chief Negotiator, and
myself were the only people who were legally trained. As a result some of
the drafting is unusual, much to the consternation of Foreign Affairs and
State Department lawyers when they came to look at it! But it was written
for the people who have to administer it. It is a functional arrangement, not
an artifact of the high art of diplomacy.
Let me highlight the key aspects of the agreement.
First, it is an important conservation document. Under the agreement,
management and allocation are abundance-based. This means that when
abundance is high, catches are high. When abundance is low, catches are
low. This may seem so elementary that you would wonder why it has to be
mentioned. But under the earlier Treaty annexes, shares were based on catch
ceilings. Thus, regardless of whether stocks were abundant a party was enti-
tled to catch up to its ceiling. This meant that when stocks were in decline,
the state hat had the first opportunity to fish, generally Alaska, would take up
to its ceiling. Those lower down on the salmon's pat could only catch up to
their ceiling at the risk of over fishing the stock.
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Catch ceilings reflected thinking at a time of high abundance. From a
Canadian point of view, it made sure that the U.S would not take the benefits
of high abundance in Canadian stocks. They could only fish up to their ceil-
ings. But, as I have mentioned, by 1999 we were talking about sharing the
burdens of conservation, not the benefits of abundance. Protection against
over fishing at low abundances was a much greater priority.
Finally, on conservation, the Agreement recognizes, in precatory lan-
guage, the importance of habitat to the future of the salmon fishery. This
was a matter of particular importance to the Tribes and generally seen as an
important additional part of the PST regime.
Second, the 1999 Agreement is an important management agreement. A
new conservation-based management regime has been developed for Chi-
nook salmon. This had been a point of bitter contention for many years.
Unlike some stocks, which are more area-specific, Chinook range coast wide.
It is the King Salmon and central to the myths, the history, and the culture of
the Pacific Northwest. It was the one area where we all had to negotiate to-
gether. Further, some Chinook stocks are endangered and subject to Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA) listings.
The regimes developed for ocean-based Chinook fisheries and for more
coastal and in-river fisheries involved numerical limits varying according to
abundance levels, catch reduction obligations, a special arrangement in re-
spect of threatened stocks (a "weak stock gate") and a commitment to work
towards managing on the basis of total, and not just catch-based, mortality.
In short, this is not just an allocation regime; it is a regime under which
stocks can be rebuilt.
The Parties committed also to develop a management and conservation
regime for coho in the southern area, something that did not exist before-
again, an important new development in cooperative management under the
PST.
Third, the Agreement lasts for ten years, and in the case of Fraser River
sockeye for twelve years. Critical to this was an acceptance by the U.S. that
its share of Fraser River sockeye would be phased down to no more than
sixteen point five percent. The U.S. had entered the negotiations in March of
1998 with a proposal for twenty-eight to thirty percent share. It was able to
reduce to sixteen point five percent through buying out a substantial portion
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of the Washington state non-tribal fleet. In many respects this was an impor-
tant key to the whole Agreement. Fraser river sockeye has always been at
the center of the PST. Before 1985, the U.S. share was as much as fifty per-
cent. We knew that a drastic reduction in the U.S. catch would make the
overall agreement saleable in British Columbia. Without that reduction in
U.S. catch, the 1999 negotiations would have failed as well.
Fourth, the Agreement establishes a Fund for conservation of the re-
source, contributed to solely by the U.S. A total sum of one hundred forty
million, established fully by the end of 2003, is to be divided between the
Northern and Southern boundary areas and used for salmon conservation and
enhancement. This is an endowment fund with only the income to be spent,
so that the Fund will exist in perpetuity. The Fund is important both for the
future of the salmon resource and symbolically. Since it is the U.S. that
pays, the issue of compensation for past equity imbalances, which had been a
stumbling block in previous negotiations, could be removed from the table.
Further, the amount was substantially larger than any amounts contemplated
by the U.S. in earlier discussions. In this regard, growing concern over en-
dangered species, plus a budgetary crisis in Alaska were helpful in achieving
agreement.
Finally, the 1999 Agreement is a document about cooperation. It recog-
nizes that the parties have to work together on science, as well as on man-
agement at the Commission and panel levels and on management on a day-to
day basis across the border. It provides for the creation of a committee on
Scientific Cooperation and contemplates cross border information and staff
exchanges. These provisions of the Agreement may be seen as stating the
obvious, as not imposing specific obligations, but they represent a key step
forward from the verbal slinging matches of the past. "Our science is real;
Alaskan science is 'political science."' The Agreement moves on from this.
It focuses on dispute avoidance, rather than procedures for dispute settle-
ment, although there is agreement to work on the implementation of the
technical dispute settlement provisions of Article XII.
It's Never Over Until It's Over
Although we announced an agreement and embodied it in an exchange of
diplomatic notes, it was not all over. The Funds had to be voted by Con-
gress. In fact, the Agreement itself could not actually commit the U.S. to
contributing the Funds. That would have been impinging on Congressional
authority. This was dealt with in the Agreement with some creative drafting.
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Also, the U.S. could not implement its obligations until the Agreement was
vetted for compatibility under the ESA in accordance with its domestic law.
Thus, in order to protect Canada from U.s. non-compliance, it was provided
that if Congress failed to vote funds or it the ESA determination had not been
made by December 1999, the Agreement would be suspended.
After the agreement was announced, it was discovered that there was
another internal issue in the U.S. that had not been part of the negotiations.
There was outstanding litigation in the U.S. between the Tribes and Alaska
relating to Chinook, which Alaska wanted stayed during the term of the
Agreement. In exchange for compliance with the Agreement, Alaska wanted
to be assured that the Agreement would protect them from litigation. Discus-
sions in the U.S. before the Agreement was formally concluded appeared to
have resolved this issue and the litigation was to be stayed.
Now, Congress did vote what we expected them to do, that is the first
twenty million for the Fund. However, riders were attached to the appropria-
tion. The relevant riders related first to the U.s. voting structure in the PSC.
It was provided that on issues affecting the north, Alaska would have the
deciding U.S. vote and on issues affecting the south, the southern states and
the Tribes would have the deciding vote.
The other rider related to the litigation. It was provided that unless the
Tribes filed their requests for the stay s by December 31, the moneys appro-
priated could not be allocated to the Fund. Essentially Congress would have
to re-appropriate the Funds. But remember too, if the funds were not made
available by December 31, the Treaty would be suspended.
Now these were unilateral riders, attached at the Congressional level.
They were not part of the negotiations, nor apparently the result of internal
bargaining within the U.S. negotiating team. Needless to say, the Tribes
were not pleased to learn of this change in the voting structure on the U.S.
side within the PSC. They indicated that they would not file the requests for
the stays of the litigation. So that in November we were faced with the pos-
sibility that the Treaty would be suspended at the end of the year with no
guarantee that Congress would re-appropriate the Funds. This situation was
beginning to look like the ill-fated East Coast fisheries Agreement of 1979,
which died in Congress after being so carefully and thoroughly negotiated.
This led to intensive negotiations on the U.S. side, with us on the sideline.
During the negotiation of the Agreement we were able to work to bring the
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different elements of the U.S. together. Now we could only watch and won-
der at the way in which an international arrangement was being held hostage
to domestic politics- a situation that is now unfamiliar in the U.S. Finally,
accommodations were reached and on December 29, at around mid after-
noon, the requisite requests for the consent orders to stay the litigation were
filed. Since December 30 was a holiday in the U.S. and December 31 was a
Saturday, we avoided having the Agreement suspended by about three hours.
But, even then it was not quite over. There was a further rider in Con-
gress's appropriation of the Funds. If the courts did not make the orders
staying the litigation by March 1, the money had to revert to the U.S. Treas-
ury. Since these were consent orders, it seemed unlikely that there were any
barriers to their being made, and in fact eventually the orders were entered.
Implementation
So the money was voted. Of course, the fish did not cooperate. The first
season was disastrous for Fraser River sockeye, so that the impact of the
Washington State reduction was hardly noticed.
But, by all accounts, the agreement has been working well. Two seasons
have now gone my without the dispute and rancor of the past. The Fund has
been set up. Indeed, not only did Congress vote the allocations for year two,
it authorized the allocations for the following years as well to bring the Fund
up o the full one hundred forty-nine million. Canadians and the U.S. cooper-
ate in the management of the Fund and those who have been involved in the
past find the cooperative spirit quite remarkable. The committee on Scien-
tific Cooperation has also been established. So it is quite possible that a new
page has been truly turned.
Implications
Although this presentation may give the impression of the orderly im-
plementation of a well-crafted plan, let me assure you that the reality was
different. The process was on of improvisation and trial and error. What I
have done now is to look back and reconstruct it into a form that it probably
did not have at the time.
What it demonstrates is that agreements of this kind are the product of
time and circumstances. A whole variety of circumstances came together to
make it possible. These included our domestic conservation needs; a Minis-
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ter of Fisheries who was prepared to take, at considerable political risk,
measures that were necessary to achieve conservation and an agreement;
ESA listings in Washington and Oregon which led Governor Locke of Wash-
ington to take a realistic view of what was important for the economy of his
state; Alaska's budgetary difficulties, which made a fund for conservation
look really attractive to the fishing industry.
More fundamentally, it demonstrates the complexity of negotiating issues
of this kind with the U.S. when you are dealing with issues that are in fact, at
least, within the authority of a state rather than the federal government. The
multi-layered political process in the U.S. means that it is simply not possi-
ble, if you want to be successful, to negotiate with the U.S. on the basis of
federal government to federal government. You have to ensure that you are
dealing with those who make the decision or who represent the decision
makers. And that is not always the U.S. administration.
After a few years as Canada's ambassador the U.S. Alan Gotlieb once
commented that Canada's influence in Washington was like that of any lobby
group. You had to get involved with Congress, with the White House, and
with others, and act as any effective lobby group could do. He was suggest-
ing, I believe, that in dealing with the U.S. it is not sufficient to treat issues as
sovereign state to sovereign state. In many respects, the negotiation of the
1999 Pacific Salmon agreement bears that comment out.
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